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USURY: 1979 FLORIDA STATUTORY REFORM
PARTIALLY SOLVES USURY REGULATION DEFECTS
INTRODUCTION

"If thou lend money to any of my people that is poor by thee, thou shalt
not be to him as a userer."' Such was the simplicity of usury law 3,500 years
ago. In the modern commercial world, however, usury has become a complex
problem for the lender as interest rates have escalated. In early 1979 the prime
rate reached almost twelve per cent.2 Lenders have responded to the nationwide
interest rate surge by adopting charges and devices to increase effective yields
above state usury limits.3
Recent market interest rates became incompatible with Florida's former
ten percent general usury and ceiling.4 The Florida legislature responded in
1979 with an across-the-board statutory reform (1979 Act) which raised maximum legal rates to at least eighteen percent. The Act allows additional interest
to be charged by certain lenders and removes some ambiguities in the Florida
usury statutes. While the recent amendments take some pressure off of lenders
squeezed by market rates that are higher than the lawful rate, it does not solve
all the problems which arise under Florida's usury laws. Moreover, the 1979
Act leaves prior law controlling on loans made before its effective date,6 which
ensures that older law remnants will govern some litigation for many years.
This note discusses the critical areas in Florida's usury law for both the
lender and the borrower. Established principles of usury law are analyzed, with
an emphasis on the most recent developments in this area of the law, such as
interest parity and the use of a 360-day year for calculations. Areas into which
the law has only begun to venture, such as the effect of wraparound mortgages
on usury law, are also discussed. Because usury did not exist at common law in
Florida,7 it is entirely a creature of statute.8 Therefore, this note initially examines the statutory provisions and exemptions which are essential to an
understanding of Florida usury law.
STATUTORY PROVISIONS

Subject to the exemptions created by other statutes,9 Florida usury law is
1. Exodus 22:25 (King James).
2. Wall St. J., Jan. 30, 1979, at 1, col. 2.
3. Wall St. J., Aug. 25, 1978, at 3, col. I and Nov. 7, 1978, at 37, col. 2. The former article
describes how one New York bank seized upon a seldom-used federal provision allowing
national banks to increase their yields above state ceilings when rates are high. In the latter
article, a prominent New York bank was reported to have begun charging the legal maximum
interest rate plus a .025% "origination fee." See text accompanying notes 144-164 infra for a
discussion of fees which are considered additional interest.
4. FLA. STAT. §687.03 (1977).
5. 1979 Fla. Laws, ch. 79-274.
6. 1979 Fla. Laws, ch. 79-274, §15.
7. Yaffee v. International Co., 80 So. 2d 910, 912 (Fla. 1955).
8. FLA. STAT. ch. 687 (Supp. 1978).
9. See text accompanying notes 53-92 infra.
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controlled by chapter 687 of the Florida Statutes. A usury judgment generally
will be controlled by the statutes in effect at the time the action was brought,
unless application of those statutes would create an illegal retroactive penalty.' 0
Usury is most commonly raised as a defense by a borrower in a foreclosure
action," but it is also available as an affirmative action to recover usurious
interest paid by the borrower.' 2 If a contract is adjudged usurious, it is not
automatically void; instead, the lender is liable for the statutory penalities. 5

Chapter687
Chapter 687 defines several categories of loans and establishes a maximum
interest rate for each. Monetary penalties are provided for certain violations of
the rate ceilings, while other statutory violations incur criminal sanctions.
Special rules exist for loans to corporations, and other provisions regulate incidental aspects of the loan transaction. Each of these statutory facets is considered seriatim.4

1. Rates. The statute provides a general ceiling of eighteen percent per
annum on loans of up to $500,000, and twenty-five percent on loans which exceed that amount.'1 The maximum rates apply not only to charges which are
expressly designated as interest, but also to any "contrivance or device what-

ever"' 6 whereby the debtor is made to pay more than the lawful interest rate.
Exemptions are created for sales of bonds in excess of $100 and for mortgages
secured by or money loaned on such bonds.17 Exemptions are also provided for
loans which are insured, guaranteed or purchased by the Federal Housing Administration, Veteran's Administration or certain other federal agencies.' 8
10. Goodfriend v. Druck, 289 So. 2d 710, 711 (Fla. 1974) (statute amended while appeal
was pending and appellate court bound by new maximum 10% rate); Tel Serv. Co. v. General
Capital Corp., 227 So. 2d 667, 671 (Fla. 1969) (statute amended while appeal was pending).
But see Yaffee v. International Co., 80 So. 2d 910, 912 (Fla. 1955) (statute would not be applied retroactively when its effect was to create rather than repeal a penalty).
11. Gunn Plumbing, Inc. v. Dania Bank, 252 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1971). Usury is subject to
limitations generally imposed upon defenses. Id. at 4.
12. Tel Serv. Co. v. General Capital Corp., 227 So. 2d 667, 672-73 (Fla. 1969) (corporate
obliger); Chakford v. Sturm, 65 So. 2d 864, 866 (Fla. 1953) (noncorporate obligor). Usury
may also be properly brought in an action for declaratory relief by a borrower. Bella Isla
Constr. Corp. v. Trust Mortgage Corp., 347 So. 2d 649, 659 (Fla. 3d D.CA. 1977).
13. Gunn Plumbing, Inc. v. Dania Bank, 252 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1971); Yaffee v. International
Co., 80 So. 2d 910, 912 (Fla. 1955). State statutes also accord affirmative defenses to the borrower. Id.
14. As currently codified, rates are governed by FLA. STAT. §687.03 (Supp. 1978); penalties
are covered by FLA. STAT. §687.04 (1977); and criminal usury is embodied in FLA. STAT.
§687.071 (1977). FLA. STAT. §687.11 (1977) contains special rules applicable to loans to corporations.
15. FLA. STAT. §§687.02 (1977), 687.03 (Supp. 1978), as amended by, 1979 Fla. Laws, ch.
79-274, §§12, 13. While rate provisions are contained in both of these differently worded sections, no meaningful distinction has been made between the situations covered by the two
sections. Thus, only FLA. STAT. §687.03 (Supp. 1978) will be cited.
16. FIA. STAT. §687.03(1) (Supp. 1978).
17. Id.
18. FLA. STAT. §687.03(2)(a) (Supp. 1978). These exemptions apply only to loans made
after Oct. 1, 1976. FLA. STAT. §687.03(2)(b) (Supp. 1978) and 1976 Fla. Laws, ch. 76-124, §1.
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In computing the effective rate of interest per annum on a loan, any interest
charges taken in advance by the lender19 will be subject to the provisions of the
so-called "spreader" rule in determining their impact on the effective interest
rate.2 0 The rule requires that initial charges be allocated ratably over the term
of the loan for the purpose of calculating the effective rate. For example, if a
lender charges three "points" 21 when a three-year loan is made, the effect will
be to add one percent per year to the stated interest rate, rather than adding
three percent to the interest charged in the first year. If the loan's stated interest rate is eight percent, the effective rate is nine percent, although the borrower
paid an amount equal to eleven percent of the principal in the first year.
Chapter 687's spreader rule section is most often applied to loans with
acceleration provisions which require that all payments become due upon the
borrower's default on any one payment. The statute provides that in considering the effect of interest taken in advance by the lender on a loan which is accelerated, the additional interest attributable to such advance interest will be
computed over the original term of the note, rather than over the shorter term
resulting from acceleration.22 In the example of the three-year loan at eight
percent, with three points taken in advance, if the borrower defaulted at the
end of one year and the points were spread only over that year, the effective
rate would be eleven percent for the year. However, the spreader rule requires
that notwithstanding accelerated maturity, the points must be spread over the
original three-year term. Thus, the effective interest rate would be nine percent.
23
Application of the spreader rule is limited to charges taken in advance.
Because the rule does not operate on all interest, it should not be construed to
allow a lender who accelerates a loan to collect the entire interest which would
have been due had the loan run full term. 24 Nor can it be used as an averaging
device to allow a lender to collect usurious interest on a loan during one or
more years on the rationale that the average interest over the entire term does
not exceed the maximum rate.25 Therefore, when interest on a loan is tied to a
floating scale such as the prime rate, and in one year interest exceeds the
statutory rates, it is not a defense to a usury charge that the interest rate when
See also 1978 Fla. Laws, ch. 78-211, §1 (effective July 1, 1978), which clarifies the exemption on
"a commitment to insure by the Federal Housing Administration." Id.
19. See text accompanying notes 141-164 infra.
20. F.A. STAT. §687.03(3) (Supp. 1978). See generally Note, Usury Implications of Frontend Interest and Interest in Advance, 29 S.W.L.J. 748 (1975) (hereinafter cited as Front-end
Interest); Note, Usury in Texas: Spreading Interest Over the Entire Period of the Loan, 12
Hous. L. REv. 159 (1974).
21. A point is a charge that equals 1% of the principal amount of a loan. See, e.g., B. F.
Saul Co. v. West End Park North, Inc., 250 Md. 707, 713, 717, 246 A.2d 591, 595, 597 (1968).
22. FLA. STAT. §687.03(3) (Supp. 1978).
23. Sailboat Apartment Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Mortgage & Realty Trust, 363 So. 2d
564, 568 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1978) (under FLA. STAT. §687.03(3), relating to interest and usury,
only an advance or forbearance, and not variable interest charges may be spread over the
stated loan term for the purpose of determining the interest rate).
24. See text accompanying notes 188-192 infra for an analysis of this separate issue.
25. Sailboat Apartment Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Mortgage & Realty Trust, 363 So. 2d
at 568 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1978).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1979

3

Florida Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 4 [1979], Art. 4

19791

USURY: 1979 FLORIDA STATUTORY

REFORM

averaged over the full term of the loan was below the maximum rate. 26 The
spreader rule is also limited in application if a short-term construction loan
and long-term mortgage financing are provided on a project by the same
lender but are written as separate loans. Charges taken in advance of the first
loan may not be spread over the longer second-term loan but only over the
27

term of the first loan.

A final provision of the usury rate statutes provides that, in addition to the
higher interest rates chargeable on loans over $500,000, the lender may participate in the profits of a venture by taking property whose value depends on
the venture's success.2 8 Allowable participation interests include stock options,
interest in profits, receipts and residual values.29
2. Penalties. Two monetary penalties are provided for an interest charge
which exceeds the legal rate but does not exceed twenty-five percent of the
loan. 0 First, after a lender receives an adverse usury judgment, he cannot collect the remaining interest due on the loan. In addition, a lender must repay
the borrower double the amount of interest he has already received.3' The
latter penalty, however, cannot be used by the borrower to recover more than
an amount necessary to cancel the entire debt.3 2 If the face value is greater than
what the borrower received, the penalty should be deducted from the amount
actually received by the borrower rather than from the face value of the note. 3
For example, if a note recites a face value of $2,500, of which only $2,000 was
advanced to the borrower and $500 was reserved as a "bonus,"' 4 a judgment
26. Id.
27. Financial Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Burleigh House, Inc., 05 So. 2d 59, 62 (Fla. 3d
D.C.A. 1975), cert. discharged, 336 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1976). In Burleigh House, the parties
intended that Financial Federal supply both construction money and long-term financing for
condominium purchases. However, because the permanent financing would take effect on the
construction note after the recited maturity date of 18 months, the construction money and
long-term financing were distinct loan and charges taken in advance of the construction loan
were spread over 18 months rather than 26 1/2 years. Therefore, the court affirmed a judgment
for the borrower. Id. at 62.
28. FLA. STAT. §687.03(4) (Supp. 1978).
29. Id. "Stock options" has been construed not to encompass a 50% stock interest given
to the lender which has a definite value not dependent on the success of the venture. Continental Mortgage Investors v. Sailboat Key, Inc., 354 So. 2d 67, 78 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1977). See
also Cooper v. Rothman, 57 So. 985, 988 (Fla. 1912) (regarding court's handling of notes);
Diversified Enterprises, Inc. v. West, 141 So. 2d 27, 31 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1962) (regarding court's
handling of options and notes). Under FLA. STAT. §687.03(3)(a) (Supp. 1978), a loan exceeds
$500,000 if such a sum is ever reached during the term of the loan, or if the sum is not
xeached but the parties agree at the outset and reasonably expect the loan to reach such a
sum.
g0.

FLA.STAT.

§687.04 (1977).

31. Id. If no interest is taken or reserved, the usurious lender loses the interest. If the
interest has been taken or reserved, then the lender must repay double the amount of interest
received.
32. Gordon v. West Fla. Enterprises of Pensacola, Inc., 177 So. 2d 859, 862 (Fla. 1st D.C.A.
1965).
33. Ross v. Atlas Fin. Corp., 152 So. 410 (Fla. 1984).
34. A bonus is a charge imposed on the borrower at the time of a loan as consideration
for lending money. See text accompanying notes 161-163 infra.
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for a double penalty on the $500 interest would reduce the enforceable debt to
$1,000. S5
The double forfeiture penalty does not apply to a bona fide purchaser of a
note bearing a usurious interest rate. A bona fide purchaser is one who takes
the note before maturity without notice of its usurious character, where the
s6
character of the note is not apparent on its face.
3. Criminal Usury. The criminal usury provisions of chapter 687 provide
that a lender willfully charging an interest rate greater than twenty-five percent, unless authorized by law to do so, 3 7 is guilty of a second-degree misdemeanor.3 8 A lender willfully charging in excess of forty-five percent is guilty
of a third-degree felony. 39 Possession of records of the latter type of loan is a
first-degree misdemeanor.40 A statutory immunity prohibits persons from refusing to testify or to give evidence of a violation of the criminal usury provisions. 41 The most significant of the criminal usury penalties provides that
such a loan is not an enforceable debt, and principal as well as interest is
42
forfeited.
4. Special Rules on Loans to Corporations. The predecessor of the 1979
Act established different interest rate ceilings for individual and corporate
borrowers. Interest rates on individual loans were limited to ten percent, while
loans to corporations were subject to a fifteen percent rate ceiling.43 However,
the interest liability of an individual guarantor of a loan to a corporation was
limited to the individual rate ceiling of ten percent.44 A corporate borrower
prevailing in a usury claim could recover all interest it had paid,45 but it was
precluded from collecting double interest unless the loan exceeded $500,000.46
35. $2,000 - ($500 x 2) rather than $2500 30, 34 (Fla. 1952).
36.

($500 x 2). See, e.g., Ayvas v. Green, 57 So. 2d

FLA. STAT. §687.04 (Supp. 1978).

37. See note 59 infra and accompanying text.
38. FLA. STAT. §687.071(2) (1977).
39. FLA. STAT. §687.071(3) (1977). Under FLA. STAT. §687.071(4) (1977), a loan in which the
lender and borrower understand that delay or failure in repayment could result in harm to
person, reputation or property through violent or other criminal means is an "extortionate
extension of credit," which is a second degree felony.
40. FLA. STAT. §687.071(5) (1977).
41. FLA. STAT. §687.071(6) (1977). A person compelled to testify under this section is immunized from prosecution or penalty arising from his testimony. However, in State v. Powell,
343 So. 2d 892 (Fla. Ist D.C.A. 1977), the immunity did not apply when a person was compelled by defense counsel in a bribery prosecution to testify about a criminally usurious loan
related to the bribery, because the testimony was not compelled in a prosecution brought
under FLA. STAT. §687.071 (1977).
42. FLA. STAT. §687.071(7) (1977).
43. FtA. STAT. §687.03 (Supp. 1978).
44. FLA. STAT. §687.11(1) (1977).
45. Id.
46. Tel. Serv. Co. v. General Capital Corp., 227 So. 2d 667, 673 (Fla. 1969) (penalty for
usurious loan to corporation is solely forfeiture of interest). See also Woodgate Dev. Corp. v.
Hamilton Inv. Trust, 351 So. 2d 14, 16-17 (Fla. 1977); Continental Mortgage Investors v.
Sailboat Key, Inc., 354 So. 2d 67, 74 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1977). The Sailboat Key court interpreted
FLA. STAT. §687.11(4) (1977) as placing all usurious loans over $500,000 out of FLA. STAT.
§687.11 (1977) and within FLA. STAT. §687.04 (1977), which provides for double penalties. Id.
at 74.
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The criminal usury principal forfeiture penalty applied to loans to corporations
7
in excess of $500,000 made after June 18, 1974.4
The 1979 usury act prospectively abolishes all distinctions between loans to
individuals and corporations and repeals these rules regarding corporate
loans. 48 Nonetheless, the individual-corporate distinction, with its concomitant
rates and complications, will apply to transactions occurring prior to the new
Act's effective date.
5. Miscellaneous Provisions. Additional provisions of the 1979 Act which
are not treated in this note include rules concerning attorney's fees,4 9 required
insurance on mortgaged property 0 and requirements for giving receipts to
borrowers. 51 In addition, some licensed lenders will not be considered insofar
as they are exempt from these provisions.-2
Usury Exemptions

The most familiar concepts of usury law are embodied in the general rate
statutes. Historically, the numerous statutory exceptions to these rates have
been the most important provisions to commercial lenders in Florida. 53 Although a ten percent rate ceiling was in existence prior to the 1979 Act, several
exemptions allowed commercial lenders licensed under the Florida Statutes to
make loans at rates greatly exceeding ten percent. Statutory exemptions existed for consumer finance companies, licensed automobile financers, installment sellers and home improvement financers, insurance premium finance
companies, credit unions, industrial savings banks, state banks and savings and
loan associations. The exemptions were retained by the 1979 Act; however,
many are largely superfluous because they prescribe rates no higher than the
eighteen percent general ceiling.
The 1979 Act also began some necessary reform of the more ambiguous

47. This was the effective date of 1974 Fla. Laws, ch. 74-232, §§2-3, which amended

FLA.

§687.11 (1973) to provide that the latter would not apply to loans greater than $500,000.
Thus, the double forfeiture and forfeiture of principal penalties previously inapplicable to
corporate loans were now applied to loans over $500,000. Because of the ex post facto law
STAT.

prohibitions, the "criminal usury" sanctions, including forfeiture of principal, could not apply

retroactively to loans made before the effective date of the amendment. Continental Mortgage
Investors v. Sailboat Key, Inc., 354 So. 2d 67, 74 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1977).
48. 1979 Fla. Laws, ch. 79-274, §§14-15.
49. FrA. STAT. §§687.05, .06 (1977) (provision in promissory note requiring borrower to
pay attorneys' fees incurred in collection is not considered interest).
50. FrA. STAT. §687.06 (1977) (required insurance on security is not interest).
51. FiA. STAT. §687.08 (1977) (requiring for secured loans that the lender give a signed

receipt upon payment or forfeit interest).
52.

FLA. STAT.

§687.10 (1977).

53. FLA. STAT. §687.031 (1977) specifically preserves statutory exceptions to the general
usury statutes. The constitutionality of the statutory exemptions to the usury laws has been
upheld against an attack that they constitute "special laws" proscribed by FLA. CONsT. art. III,
§ll(a)(9), and by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1. In Cesarv v. Second Nat'l Bank of North
Miami, 369 So. 2d 917 (Fla. 1979) the Florida supreme court rejected a contention that state

and federal constitutional provisions prevented the legislature from according different treatment to different lenders.
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existing exemptions.- Poor drafting of the exemptions has created numerous
questions about what charges were permitted or forbidden by the statutory
language. 55 Because interest rates historically have been below ten percent, the
confusing statutes were not relied upon and thus not litigated. During the
recent interest rate spiral, however, lenders have been forced to rely on exemptions to achieve market-rate returns. While the 1979 Act remedies some of
the ambiguities, some uncertainties in the exemptions continue to exist as a
potential source of litigation. 56
Lenders licensed under the Florida Consumer Finance Act 57 are entitled to
an exemption which has continued vitality under the new eighteen percent
general ceiling. These lenders are authorized to make loans of up to $2,500 and
to charge interest of thirty percent on the first $500, twenty-four percent on
any amount between $500 and $1,000 and eighteen percent on the remainder. 58
Qualified lenders who violate these maximum rates may be penalized by
forfeiture of all interest, principal and charges. 59 The Credit Union Act 60 provides another exemption from the usury statutes. The exemption authorizes
credit unions to charge one-half percent interest per month more on unpaid
balances than under the prior legislation.61
The Savings Association Act 6 2 exempts state and federal savings and loan

associations entirely from the operation of the general usury statutes.6 3 The
vague language of the statute has made the extent of this significant exemption
unclear, leaving lenders hesitant to rely on its provisions.64 For example, the
statute initially suggests a blanket exemption for savings and loan associations,
but the section of the same statute empowering such associations to make loans

54. 1979 Fla. Laws, ch. 79-274, §§7, 9 (amending FLA. STAT. §§656.17, 659.18 (1977)).
55. In 1977, the Florida legislature substantially broadened the availability of the exemptions to most licensed lenders through interest parity legislation. See text accompanying
notes 70-78 infra.
56. See text accompanying notes 93-109 infra.
57. FLA. STAT. §516.031(1) (1977).
58. FLA. STAT. §516.031(1) (1977). Certain other legitimate costs incidental to these loans
are permitted by FLA. STAT. §516.031(3) (1977), such as "documentary stamps, recording fees
and attorneys' fees and other costs of collection .... " Id.
59. FLA. STAT. §516.031(3) (1977). This penalty is also applicable to a lender who splits up
a loan to an individual to take advantage of higher interest rates allowed on the first $I,000
of a chapter 516 loan. Violation of these provisions is also a second-degree misdemeanor under
FLA. STAT. §516.19 (1977). See Smetal Corp. v. Family Loan Co., 119 Fla. 497, 508-09, 161 So.
438, 443 (Fla. 1935) (discussion of the penalty clause).
60. FLA. STAT. ch. 657 (1957).
61. FLA. STAT. §657.14 (1977) (as amended by 1979 Fla. Laws ch. 79-274, §8).
62. FLA. STAT. ch. 665 (1977).
63. FLA. STAT. §665.395 (1977): "No fines, interest or premiums paid on loans made by
any building and loan association shall be deemed usurious .... " FLA. STAT. §665.511 (1977)
makes the language of FLA. STAT. §665.395 (1.977) applicable to federal savings and loan associations.
64. For example, the court in Padgett v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n of Lake Worth, 297
So. 2d 101 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1974), cert. discharged, 329 So. 2d 313 (1976), declined to decide
the exemption issue, choosing instead to decide on grounds of statutory retroactivity.
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limits property improvement and mobile home financing loans to eighteen
5
percent interest.6
Furthermore, the import of this exemption for savings and loan associations
is unclear in light of the concomitant limitations on interest chargeable by
those lenders for certain loans. The total exemption from the general usury
provisions for certain classes of loans, in conjunction with regulation by independent statutory provisions, is not inherently problematic. Arguably, however,
the savings and loan exemption does not comprise an integrated set of loan
regulations, raising the possibility that general usury law augments the exemption. These regulations, for example, may be incomplete because penalty
provisions are not provided for violation of the special rate limitations. Presumably, the legislature did not intend to enact an unenforceable prohibition.
Logically, the penalty provisions of the general usury statutes could be applied
to violations of the savings and loan exemption interest rate limitations.66 Such
application would be inconsistent with the concept of autonomous regulation
under the exemption of loans by savings and loan associations from the operation of general usury law. This hiatus thus leaves lenders uncertain of whether
the savings and loan associations indeed were benefited by a blanket exemption,
or whether the prohibitive regulations in the exemption were subject to unspecified substantive supplementation by the general usury statute.
The Florida supreme court's recent decision, Catogas v. Southern Federal
Savings & Loan Association of Broward County,67 appeared to settle much of
this confusion. The Catogas court held that the Savings Association Act does
provide a complete exemption for both state and federal savings and loan associations from the usury laws. While the 1979 Act changed the fourteen percent limit previously in the exemption to eighteen percent, presumably to make
the exemption consistent with those 1979 Act amendments which raised the
general usury ceiling,68 such consistency appears irrelevant in light of Catogas.69
The 1979 Act takes an initial step toward needed reform by simplifying two
65. FA. STAT. §665.381(3), (4) (1977). In fact, one commentator described the statute as
allowing 14% interest (as it did prior to 1979), with only footnote treatment of the exemption
language. See Sanders, Rising Interest Rates Focus Attention on Interest Parity Act, 52 FLA.
BJ. 685, 687 (1978).
66. Alternatively, the legislature might have intended to limit any remedy to an admin-

istrative proceeding. Also, the legislature may have been unaware of the conflict.
67. 369 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1979).
68. See 1979 Fla. Laws, ch.79-274, §11.

69. In addition to the limitations stemming from the increase in the general interest rate,

judicial doctrine may further temper the utility of such a blanket exemption. In a somewhat

different context, the Florida supreme court indicated that in the absence of statutory limitations, a court can strike down "unconscionable" interest charges on public policy grounds.

See, e.g., Continental Mortgage Investors v. Sailboat Key, Inc., 854 So. 2d 67 (Fla. d D.C.A.
1977) (public policy against interest rates over 25% prevents application by a Florida court
of the usury law of another jurisdiction though parties agreed in contract to apply such law).
Though the conflicts of law area presents different considerations from those presented here,
Sailboat Key serves as a warning of the court's attitude toward interest rates which it deems
offensive to public policy. This vague guideline gives courts wide latitude to restructure
otherwise valid loan transactions. See generally, Note, Conflict of Laws and Usury in Florida
(Feb. 14, 1978) (unpublished note in University of Florida Law School Library).
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of the most ambiguous usury exemptions. First, the complex discount loan7o
authorized to industrial savings banks was replaced with a simple eighteen
percent ceiling. The former provision was illustrative of the confusion in
Florida's usury exceptions. 71 The old statute stated an allowable rate of eight
percent, but mandated calculation of the rate in a manner which permitted
effective interest of as much as 20.5 percent on a three-year loan. 72 This resulted
because the exemption permitted the lender to take the interest charge prematurely by "discounting" the amount to be advanced by eight percent of the
loan's face value." The effective rate of return could be further inflated by
70. FLA. STAT. §656.17 (Supp. 1978). A discount loan is one in which interest at the stated
rate is subtracted from the face value of the note at the time the loan is made, rather than
being paid in installments or at maturity. Thus, because less than the face value is advanced
to the borrower, the principal amount for determining the effective interest rate will be the
amount of money (including the value of reasonable and necessary costs incurred by the
lender incident to the loan) actually received by the borrower. See text accompanying notes
165-167 infra.
71. The one appellate court which reviewed the provision described it as "a model of
vague and obscure language." Silver Sands v. Pensacola Loan & Say. Bank, 174 So. 2d 61, 66
(Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1965).
72. The effective rate could be as much as 16% and 18.25% on one and two year loans,
respectively. Determining the interest rate when a loan is being repaid in installments but the
stated interest is charged against the full original face value involves computing an average
outstanding principal during the loan term. See generally Comment, Usury - Unsecured Installment Loans-Declining Balance of PrincipalMust Be Accounted for When Calculating
Interest at the Maximum Legal Rate, 7 ST. MARY'S L.J. 288 (1975). The computation should
be made as follows:
ONE YEAR
Principal: x
8% discount: .08x
Principal y, advanced to borrower: .92x
Term (equal monthly installments): 12 months.
"Average outstanding principal" equals the total of monthly outstanding principals (12/12
in the first month, 11/12 after first payment, 10/12, 9/12 . . . 1/12 equaling 78/12) divided
by the number of months 12, (which results as .54167) times the full principal (.92x). This
equals .4983x. When the interest of .08x is divided by this figure, the effective interest rate
is slightly higher than 16%. This sum of the digits formula may be more simply stated as
z/(y2) where z equals the sum of the digits of the number of installment payments and y
equals the number of such payments. Note the formula will not work where the principal
is not repaid in equal installments.
Applying the formula to a two-year loan:
TWO YEARS
Principal: x
8% discount over two years: .16x
Principal advanced: .84x
Term (y): 24 months
Average outstanding principal is z/(y2) times the principal advanced to the borrower or
300/(242) (.5208) times .84x. The resulting average outstanding principal is .4375x. When
the interest of .16x is divided by this figure and the resulting figure is further divided by
two to reflect the fact that two years' interest is being calculated, per annum interest equals

18.28%.
73. See notes 70, 72 supra.
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requiring repayment in installments instead of a lump sum at maturity.7 4
However, reliance upon this provision was troublesome for lenders; the extent
to which the latitude to extract higher effective yields would be judicially
tolerated was unknown.
While the 1979 Act eliminates these complications by replacing the discount procedure with the general eighteen percent ceiling,7 5 another confusing
aspect of the statute was left unchanged. The 1979 Act authorizes an additional
charge of the lesser of $50 or two percent of the principal "for investigating the
character of the individual applying for the loan, the security submitted, and
all other costs .... "76 In reliance on this provision, an industrial savings bank
might consider increasing its rate of return by adding a blanket two percent
charge, up to $50 on every loan without regard to the actual costs incurred in
processing the loan." The statute is silent as to whether such a charge is permissible as a legislative estimate of average additional costs or whether a
lender using this provision is limited to recovery of actual expenses.78 Such
74. The typical notions of usury law require interest at a given rate to be computed
on the actual amount of money used by the borrower over the loan term. See, e.g., Ayvas v.
Green, 57 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 1952); Williamson v. Clark, 120 So. 2d 637 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1960). In
fact, in Silver Sands v. Pensacola Loan & Say. Bank, 174 So. 2d 61 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1965),
which is apparently the only Florida case in 43 years to interpret the savings bank loan provisions, it was held that it was usurious to charge an 8% discount for the full loan term where
it was to be repaid in installments during the term. This result, however, was statutorily altered
by 1970 Fla. Laws, ch. 70-408, §2, adding the language "notwithstanding that the principal
amount of such loans is required to be repaid in installments" to FLA. STAT. §656.17(1) (1969).
In addition, the Silver Sands court initially held that the discount could not be taken for more
than one year in advance, but withdrew from that holding on rehearing, since it was not an
issue raised on appeal. 174 So. 2d at 69. That this limitation was not intended by the legislature was made clear by 1978 Fla. Laws, ch. 78-182, §1. This amendment to FA. STAT. §656.17
(1977) provided that the effective interest rate produced by the 8% discount could not exceed
18% on a loan exceeding three years. It would be mathematically impossible to reach this rate
and the statute would thus be redundant if the entire discount for the three years (24%)
were not taken from the face value of the note before the loan proceeds are given to the
borrower. Computations for such a discount would operate as follows on a loan of $1,500 for
two years:
$1500
Face value:
$240
Discount (2 x 8%):
$1260
Amount to borrower:
If the borrower is to have the use of the full $1260 for the entire two years, then the percentage of interest is computed by dividing the interest, $240, by the principal, $1,260. The
result is 19% over two years, or 9 1/2% per annum. Note that it would be impermissible to
compute interest on a principal of $1,500, since only $1,260 was received by the borrower.
Ayvas v. Green, 57 So. 2d 30, 33 (Fla. 1952).
75. FLA. STAT. §687.03 (1977), as amended by 1979 Fla. Laws, ch. 79-274, §13.
76. FLA. STAT. §656.17(1) (1977), as amended by 1979 Fla. Laws, ch. 79-274, §7.
77. The author's knowledge of Central Florida banking procedure indicates that this is
the customary practice.
78. Case law under the usury statutes has settled many of the questions about which
charges made by a lender reflect reasonable services and which charges must be considered
interest in addition to the loan's stated interest rate. Thus, it is an easy matter to determine
whether statutory limits have been exceeded. See, e.g., Baker Mortgage Co. v. Mitchell Inv.,
Inc., 45 la. Supp. 99 (11th Cir. Ct. 1977), aff'd, Bowles v. Mitchell Inv., Inc., 363 So. 2d 1106
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legislative failure to clearly state the allowable rate of return for industrial
savings banks reduces the exemption's utility.
The deleterious impact or lack of symmetry in the 1979 provisions is further
illustrated by some exemptions in which the 1979 Act raised the stated rates
without addressing any of the conceptual inconsistencies between the exemption and the general usury statute. For example, chapter 520 of the Florida
Statutes contains provisions regulating four types of installment lenders. First,
the Motor Vehicle Sales Financing Act7 9 permits a lender financing the sale of
a motor vehicle to take interest in the form of a finance charge8 varying from
$8 per $100 per year to $17 per $100 per year, according to the age of the car.81
The lower figure for new cars was raised from $8 to $10 per $100 by the 1979
amendments, and allows an effective rate exceeding eighteen percent.8 2 Under
8 4
the 1979 Act,8 3 the second exemption under the Retail Installment Sales Act

and the third exemption under the Installment Sales Finance Act 5 allow a
licensed lender to make a finance charge of $12 per $100 or more than twentytwo percent per year on revolving charge accounts.88 Finally, under the Home
Improvement Sales and Finance Act,87 a licensed lender may charge $10 per
$100 per annum, which amounts to almost twenty percent when repayment is
made in installments.88 In each of these provisions the legislature left calculation methods intact which allow an effective yield greater than the stated rate.
These methods permit computation of interest on the principal amount over
the entire term, although repayment is made in installments. Noticeably, the
1979 Act abolished this computation method in two other usury statutes.8 9
(Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1978). Under FLA. STAT. §656.17(1) (Supp. 1978), however, the vital concern is
what charges were in the contemplation of the legislature, rather than whether the charges
would be considered interest under traditional usury laws. The answer remains unclear.
79. FLA. STAT. §§520.01-.13 (1977).
80. FLA. STAT. §520.02(8) (1977). This statute specifies what charges must be included in
computing the finance charge.
81. FLA. STAT. §520.08 (Supp. 1978). (Thereafter, amended by 1979 Fla. Laws, ch. 79-274,
§5.) It has been held that such finance charges may be computed over the term of the loan
for the entire amount financed, rather than the outstanding balance at a given time under
an installment contract. General Fin. Corp. of Fla. v. Carvajal, 23 Fla. Supp. 25 (Dade County
Small Claims Ct. 1964). The result is that the effective interest xate computed against the
actual average outstanding balance is almost double the percentage rate stated in the statute.
This result is the apparent intent of both FLA. STAT. §520.08(2) and §520.07(2) (Supp. 1978).
82. 1979 Fla. Laws, ch. 79-274, §5. The charge yields an effective interest rate of 19.6% on
a four-year car loan. See note 72 supra.
83. FxA. STAT. §§520.30-.42 (1977).
84. FLA. STAT. §§520.50-.57 (1977).
85. 1979 Fla. Laws, ch. 79-274, §6.
86. FLA. STAT. §§520.35(3), 520.57 (1977). Violation of this provision is a second-degree
misdemeanor and can result in an interest forfeiture under FLA. STAT. §520.39 (1977). See
note 72 supra for computations.
87. FiA. STAT. §§520.60-.992 (1977).
88. FLA. STAT. §520.78 (1977). This does not apply, however, to home improvement loans
made or held by a building and loan or savings and loan association or a bank. FLA. STAT.
§520.992 (1977). Presumably, those loans would be controlled by the interest rates applicable
to them. See note 72 suprafor computations.
89. See text accompanying notes 70-75 and 80-82 supra.
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The complications arising under the chapter 520 exemptions and the processing charge authorization for industrial savings banks reflect the undesirability of statutory usury exemptions which set out a paradigm inapplicable to
traditional analysis under prohibitive usury law. The general provisions of
chapter 687 establish a maximum legal interest rate to which the actual interest
charged in each case is to be compared. The component variables of the actual
interest rate, interest, principal and time, and the method of computation have
been precisely defined by case law.90 A lender relying on the simple eighteen
percent ceiling in chapter 687 can determine whether his loan is usurious by
including all charges which are treated as interest in the case law in his interest
computation and applying the computation method traditionally used by the
courts. In contrast, the chapter 520 exemptions and the processing charge
authorized to industrial savings banks eschew a stated maximum rate. The
general usury provisions are exceeded by specifying allowable charges which
generate an effective yield greater than the allowable return. More importantly,
there is no body of definitive case law which is comparable to the judicial construction of the general provisions to provide guidance in using the exemptions.
For example, the case law defining "interest" is not controlling as to the issue
of what constitutes an allowable processing charge for an industrial savings
bank.
These ambiguities are a potential source of litigation. 91 The best solution
is to restate the exemptions in terms of simple interest ceilings thus bringing
the exemptions into conjunction with prohibitive provisions on which there is
common understanding and a wealth of case law. The 1979 Act applied, in part,
this solution to the industrial savings bank exemption by replacing the discount loan with an eighteen percent maximum interest rate. However, the
legislature should have eliminated all allowances for additional charges.9 2
Similarly, the chapter 520 exemptions should be stated in terms of an effective
interest ceiling. This action would eliminate ambiguity in the exemptions and
provide a sound basis for comparing allowable rates of return between classes
of lenders for the legislature.
Interest Parity
The usefulness of the usury exemptions was broadened in 1977 when the
,lorida legislature passed the interest parity statute. 93 Interest parity allows
certain lenders licensed under Florida or federal law9" to utilize otherwise unavailable exemptions to charge interest on a loan equal to the highest interest
90. See text accompanying notes 140-195 infra.
91. The smaller, overlooked matters are most often the source of usury problems. See, e.g.,
Ellis Nat'l Bank of Tallahassee v. Davis, 359 So. 2d 466 (Fla. Ist D.C.A. 1978) (usury caused
by computation of interest based on a 360-day year rather than a 365-day year for ease of
calculation). See text accompanying notes 193-195 infra.
92. FLA. STAT. §659.18 (1977), as amended by 1979 Fla. Laws, ch. 79-274, §9.
93. 1977 Fla. Laws, ch. 77-371 (codified at FLA. STAT. §687.12 (1977)).
94. Lenders and creditors are licensed under federal law, FLA. STAT. chs. 516, 520, 627 (pt.
XIV), 654, 656, 657, 659, 665 (1977). Those lending through a licensee under FLA. STAT., ch.
494 (1977) qualify under FrA. STAT. §687.12 (1977).
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chargeable by another lender on a similar loan. A lender electing to utilize the
more favorable usury law applicable to another lender must observe the requisite statutory limitations. 95 Prior to the 1979 Act, this was a particularly
useful device for lenders such as state banks and credit unions, whose statutes
allowed them little more than the ten percent general rate.9 6 The 1979 increase
in allowable interest rates under the general usury statute reduces the need for
lenders to rely on the exemptions. However, there is still incentive for most
lenders to attempt to take advantage of higher rates allowed by the Consumer
Finance Act.9 7 Even more attractive to lenders is the liberal savings and loan

exemption; however, its availability through interest parity is problematic. 98
If the exemption indeed creates a blanket usury exemption, the application of
interest parity would presumably allow any licensed lender to make the types
of loans available to savings and loan associations and enjoy a total exemption
from interest limitations. It is questionable whether the legislature intended
that the parity statute should so broadly dilute the general usury prohibition.
A number of serious problems are raised by the interest parity statute's
requirement that a lender meet conditions placed on the loan provision it
"borrows" from another Act. The statute does not specify which penalty is applicable when a lender licensed under one statute improperly attempts to use
an interest rate permitted by another statute. For example, the Consumer
Finance Act provides that all loans made by its licensees which exceed the
allowable interest rates are unenforceable debts. The penalty amounts to a
forfeiture of both principal and interest. 90 On the other hand, loans by state
banks which exceed the interest rate authorized on certain bank loans are subject to the penalties provided for in chapter 687,100 which in most cases will be
limited to interest forfeiture or double interest forfeiture.101 Thus, when a
lender licensed under the Consumer Finance Act relies on the rate authorized
to state banks and exceeds that rate, the court will be left to use its discretion
in determining whether the lender should forfeit the entire debt or only
interest.
One commentator has suggested that the parity statute creates interpreta10 2
tion problems when used in connection wth the credit union exemption.
95. FLA. STAT. §687.12(1) (1977). The statute does not authorize a lender to make any
type of loan it is not otherwise authorized to make under the statutes applicable to it. The
lender must merely substitute a higher interest rate available to another lender on loans
similar to the ones the lender is authorized to make. Each lender remains bound by the general regulatory provisions applicable to it under its own statutes, rather than those of another
lender whose interest rate it "borrows". In making such a loan, each lender must designate
the chapter of the Florida Statutes authorizing the interest rate. FLA. STAT. §687.12(2)-(4)
(1977).
96. See FLA. STAT. §§657.14, 659.18 (1977).
97. See text accompanying notes 57-60 supra.
98. See text accompanying notes 64-69 supra.
99. FLA. STAT. §516.18(3) (1977). See also Smetal Corp. v. Family Loan Co., 119 Fla. 497,
161 So. 488 (1935).
100. FLA. STAT. §687.04 (1977). See also FLA. STAT. §659.18(3) (1977) (penalties for loans
by banks not in excess of $15,000).
101. FLA. STAT. §687.04 (1977).
102. See Sanders, supra note 65, at 687.
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Because of the private membership nature of credit unions, the statute contains
a requirement that loans be made to members for a "provident or productive"
purpose. 10 3 It is not clear whether these limitations would apply when another
lender uses the credit union statute under interest parity. In addition, the
interest parity act may be unconstitutional because it operates to modify the
statutory usury exceptions by reference to only their tiles.1°4 These ambiguities
make lenders understandably wary of using the parity statute. The utility of
the parity election will be severely curtailed until its provisions are clarified
by the legislature.105 Recognizing this, the 1979 legislature mandated a complete
study and report on interest parity by the Department of Banking and
Finance. 06 Such a study should critically evaluate the continued usefulness of
the parity provision in view of the greater uniformity already achieved by the
1979 revisions. If the statute is to be retained, a much simpler form is desirable.
The interest parity statute has yet to be construed by a Florida court. A
Department of Banking and Finance administrative order, however, has held
that a licensee under the Florida Consumer Finance Act may use interest parity
07
to make loans at rates allowed to industrial savings banks and state banks.1
The administrative opinion considered the most important question to be
whether the loans proposed by the lender under another lender's statute are
"similar" to those authorized to the lender by its own statutes as required by
the interest parity statute. 0 For example, if lender A is authorized to make a
home mortgage loan at ten percent interest, but lender B may use an exemption
to charge an eighteen percent rate on a home mortgage loan, interest parity
would allow A, if eligible, 09 to make the loan at eighteen percent. If lender B,
however, may only make unsecured consumer loans up to $2,500 at eighteen
percent, A may not use the higher rate for its mortgage loan, because the loans
are not similar.
EFFEcT OF THE NATIONAL BANK ACr

Federal law provides that national banks are subject to the interest rate
structure of the state where the bank is located."10 However, the law implies an
103.

FLA. STAT.

§657.04(2) (1977).

104. See Sanders, supra note 65, at 687. This is proscribed by FLA. CONsr. art. III, §6.
105. Domestic Fin. Corp. v. Lewis, Fla. Dept. of Banking and Finance Admin. Order (Jan.
18, 1978), quoting the House Commerce Committee Staff Report, states: "The purpose of this
bill is to provide uniformity of maximum interest rates allowable for types or classes of loans
that more than one licensed Florida lender is authorized to make. Presently, some licensed
lenders are limited by a higher maximum rate of interest than other licensed lenders for the
same type or class of loan. This bill is designed to put all lenders on equal footing in areas

of overlapping authority, thereby increasing competition and the availability of credit in
tight money periods." Id.
106. 1979 Fla. Laws, ch. 79-274, §16.
107. Domestic Fin. Corp. v. Lewis, Fla. Dept. of Banking and Finance Admin. Order (Jan.
18, 1979).
108. Id. at 5. This requirement is found in FA. STAT. §687.12(1) (1977).

109.

See note 94 supra.

110.

12 U.S.C. §§85, 86 (1976). See also 12 C.F.R. §7.7310 (1977). National banks may also

charge 1% above the discount rate on 90-day commercial paper in the federal reserve district
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interest parity feature similar to that adopted by Florida. The effect is that
national banks are not bound by the general usury ceilings or even by those
provisions regulating state banks. Instead, national banks may charge interest
equal to that chargeable by the state's "most favored lender" for each class of
loans.""
The majority of federal cases require consideration of state case law concerning calculation of interest rather than a mere reference to the numerical
rates. 112 Some cases, however, including the 1919 United States Supreme Court
13
suggest otherwise. Evans
decision in Evans v. National Bank of Savannah,1
held that a national bank in Georgia was bound by the state's eight percent
interest ceiling, but that in computing such a rate, federal law allowed the use
of a discount" 4 amounting to an actual interest rate of 8.7 percent on a oneyear loan." 5 The majority based its reasoning on the inherent power of national
banks to discount, or receive interest in advance."16 Georgia banks, however,
were prohibited from using such a device to charge more than 8 percent interest.
The Evans Court's preoccupation with the right of national banks to take
interest in advance ignored the crucial issue of whether national banks may
take interest in advance if this action causes the effective interest rate to exceed the state's legal rate. Where application of Evans causes a disparity between state and national bank interest rates, the result is contrary to the policy
of competitive equality between state lenders and national banks."17 In one
where they are located or 5% above such rate for commercial and agricultural loans over
$25,000.
111. Tiffany v. Nat'l Bank of Mo., 85 U.S. 409 (1874); Fisher v. First Nat'l Bank of
Omaha, 548 F.2d 255 (8th Cir. 1977); Fisher v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 538 F.2d 1284 (7th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977); Haas v. Pittsburg Nat'l Bank, 526 F.2d 1083 (3d
Cir. 1976); Northway Lanes v. Hackley Union Nat'l Bank &Trust Co., 464 F.2d 855 (6th Cir.
1972); United Mo. Bank of Kansas City v. Danforth, 394 F. Supp. 774 (W.D. Mo. 1975);
Comment, 28 VAND. L. RaV. 879 (1975).
112. Haas v. Pittsburg Nat'l Bank, 526 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1975); Acker v. Provident Nat'l
Bank, 512 F.2d 729 (3d Cir. 1975); American Timber & Trading Co. v. First Nat'l Bank of
Or. (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 921 (1975); First Nat'l Bank in Mena v. Nowlin, 509
F.2d 872 (8th Cir. 1975) (commented on in 28 VAND. L. REv. 879 (1975)); Partain v. First Nat'l
Bank of Montgomery, 467 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1972). 12 C.F.R. §7.7310 (1977) requires inclusion of state law insofar as it is "material to the determination of the interest rate." Id.
113. 251 U.S. 108 (1919); see also Northway Lanes v. Hackley Union Nat'l Bank & Trust
Co., 464 F.2d 855 (6th Cir. 1972); Ray v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chattanooga, 443
F. Supp. 883 (E.D. Tenn. 1978).
114. See note 70 supra.
115. 251 U.S. at 118 (Pitney, Brandeis and Clark, JJ., dissenting). The longer the loan
term, the greater the disparity allowed to national banks. See note 74 supra.
116. 251 U.S. at 113-14. The holding in Evans is limited to the discount situation. Yet its
language broadly claimed that federal law "completely defines what constitutes the taking of
usury by a national bank, referring to the state law only to determine the maximum permitted rate." Id. at 114.
117. In keeping with the policy of competitive equality between state interest rates and
those available to federal banks, the trend has been to limit Evans to its facts: a short-term
loan with a lump sum rather than installment repayment was involved in that case. See, e.g.,
First Nat'1 Bank in Mena v. Nowlin, 509 F.2d 872, 876 (8th Cir. 1975), which questioned and
limited Evans. Accord, Cohen v. District of Columbia Nat'1 Bank, 382 F. Supp. 270 (D.D.C.
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case, a national bank was allowed to make a loan at 13.58 percent, although the
state constitution limited interest to 10 percent."18 The well-reasoned dissent
in Evans" 9 concluded that absent an affirmative federal statutory authorization,
national bank discount procedures should not operate to disrupt the integrity
of state usury regulation. 120
There are other instances in which federal law has set aside state usury
statutes, despite the policy of deference to state law in this area. To avoid impairment of interstate commerce, 12 1 Congress has power through the com22
merce clause to preempt state usury laws, even as applied to state banks.
CASE LAw ON UsURY

Much of the usury law is in the decisions which have repeatedly deflected
attempts by lenders to circumvent the statutory maximum rates. The statutes
forbid charging usurious interest rates "either directly or indirectly, by way of
commission for advances, discounts, exchanges, or by any contract, contrivance
or device whatever."' 123 Accordingly, Florida courts have looked beyond the
mere form of an agreement to determine its substance. 24 "The concealment
of the needle of usury in a haystack of subterfuge will not avail to prevent its
125
pricking the body of law into action."'
In construing the usury statutes, Florida courts have held that four elements must be present in a transaction to render it usurious; (1) a loan, express or implied; (2) an understanding that the money loaned is to be returned; (3) payment or agreement to pay interest computed at a greater rate
than is allowed by law; and (4) a corrupt intent to take more than the legal
rate.2 0 Each of these categories raises issues in the determination of whether
a transaction is usurious.
1974). Ray v. American Nat'l Bank &Trust Co. of Chattanooga, 443 F. Supp. 883 (E.D. Tenn.
1978), on the other hand, extended Evans to a long-term discount loan. A comparison of two
arguments is found in First Nat'1 Bank in Mena v. Nowlin, 509 F.2d at 876-77. See Comment,
National and State Bank Interest Rates Under the National Bank Act: Preference Parity, 58
IOWA L. REv. 1250, 1265 (1973), (criticizing Northway Lanes v. Hackley Union Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co., 464 F.2d 855 (6th Cir. 1972)).
118. Ray v. American Natl Bank & Trust Co. of Chattanooga, 443 F. Supp. 883 (E.D.
Tenn. 1978) (following Northway Lanes v. Hackley Union Nat'l Bank &Trust Co., 464 F.2d 855
(6th Cir. 1972) and Evans). Only the Sixth Circuit has followed this reasoning.
119. 251 U.S. at 118-20 (Pitney, Brandeis and Clark, JJ., dissenting).
120. 12 U.S.C. §85 (1976).
121. Stephens Security Bank v. Eppivic Corp., 411 F. Supp. 61 (W.D. Ark. 1976). The
court emphasized the demonstrated need for such preemption to prevent a breakdown in
banking and commerce in the area, and pointed to the fact that the overriding federal legislation was temporary and emergency in nature. Id. at 65-66.
122. Id.
123. FLA. STAT. §687.03 (1977).
124. Richter Jewelry Co. v. Schweinert, 125 Fla. 199, 204, 169 So. 750, 752 (1936); W.B.
Dunn Co. v. Mercantile Credit Corp., 275 So. 2d 311, 314-15 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1973); Indian
Lakes Estates, Inc. v. Special Inv., Inc., 154 So. 2d 883, 888 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1963); Brown v.
Home Credit Corp., 137 So. 2d 887, 891 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1962), aff'd, 148 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 1963).
125. Kay v. Amendola, 129 So. 2d 170, 173 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1961).
126. Clark v. Grey, 101 Fla. 1058, 1065-66, 132 So. 832, 834 (1931); Bermil Corp. v. Sawyer,
353 So. 2d 579, 583 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1977).
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EXISTENCE OF A LOAN

A borrower claiming a usury violation must first prove that the contract in
question was a loan rather than another type of transaction. This question
often arises in business dealings which contain characteristics of both a loan
and a sale. Florida courts have examined the substance of the transaction, including external circumstances1 27 to determine its true nature. For example,
language in an agreement evidencing an intent to "grant, bargain and sell"
financing contracts at a discount is not controlling when other language in the
contract is expressed in loan terms and the circumstances surrounding the
transaction indicate its proper characterization as a loan.12s Similarly, the
courts have not allowed lenders to disguise their loans as leases which are
merely financing devices 129 or as joint ventures in which the lenders are
guaranteed a profit exceeding the usury limitations with no substantial risk to
their "investment."' 1 0
If a transaction is considered to be a sale, the usury laws do not apply, even
though the differences between a higher price which may be charged for a
credit sale over time and a cash sale would be usurious if considered interest. 131
This difference is known as the time-price differential. For example, a sale of
property priced at $10,000 for $16,000 with payment due in three years may be
viewed in two ways. The additional $6,000 may be considered either as interest
which exceeds the eighteen percent limitation or as a time-price differential
not within the usury laws.
In determining the applicability of the usury laws, the key distinction between loans and sales with a time-price differential is the position of the parties.
The transaction is not within the usury laws when a seller-buyer relationship
exists and the parties intend a sale. 3 2 However, if a third party intervenes,
buys the property and conveys it to the buyer, the courts have considered the
third party a lender subject to the usury laws. 3 This judicial interpretation
is particularly applicable if the buyer-borrower first approaches the vendor to
buy the property, discovers that he has inadequate funds, and then contacts the
34
third party.
Some lenders have relied on a sale-repurchase plan to exclude transactions
from usury laws. An absolute sale with a concomitant execution of an option
to repurchase at a higher price may not fall within the usury laws where the

127. Kay v. Amendola, 129 So. 2d 170 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1961).
128. W.B. Dunn Co. v. Mercantile Credit Corp., 275 So. 2d 811, 814-15 (Fla. 1st D.C.A.
1973); General Capital Corp. v. Tel Serv. Co., 212 So. 2d 869, 874-79 (Fla. 2d D.CA. 1968),
modified, 227 So. 2d 667 (Fla. 1969).
129. May v. United States Leasing Corp., 289 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1970).
130. Griffin v. Kelly, 92 So. 2d 515 (Fla. 1957).
131. Nelson v. Scarritt Motors, 48 So. 2d 168 (Fla. 1950); Davidson v. Davis, 59 Fla. 476,
52 So. 189 (1910); Mid-State Homes, Inc. v. Staines, 161 So. 2d 569 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1964).
132. See cases cited in note 131 supra.
138. Burket v. Johnson, 61 So. 197 (Fla. 1952); Hawley v. Kendall, 189 Fla. 850, 191 So. 10
(1939).
184. Burket v. Johnson, 61 So. 2d 197 (Fla. 1952).
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option is strictly voluntary 35 Florida courts will find such a transaction to be
a disguised loan subject to the usury laws if the option is binding and the only
possible commercial purpose of the arrangement is to effect a loan.136
Merely structuring a sale-repurchase agreement around a legally nonbinding option does not eliminate usury considerations. If other factors in the
agreement suggest a loan was intended, such as dose proximity between execution of the sale and option instruments, the usury provisions may be applicable.,37 Moreover, the most recent Florida case construing a sale-repurchase
agreement found the requisite compulsion in an option which was not legally
binding when the borrower stood to suffer substantial economic loss if he did
not exercise the option. 38 An earlier Florida supreme court decision applied
the usury provisions to an agreement in which the borrower sold property for
much less than its value with a nonbinding repurchase option, without specifically relying on the aspect of economic compulsion. 39 Sale-repurchase agreements, therefore, have not been a reliable means ofexcluding a transaction
from the usury laws.
Computation of the Interest Rate
The most numerous and complex problems of usury law are raised by the
question of whether the interest exacted by a particular transaction exceeds
the lawful rate. The question is not resolved merely by looking to the interest
rate recited in the agreement, but involves the interaction of the three variables
of principal, interest and time.- o A considerable body of usury case law has
developed which determines the interrelationship of these factors.
Charges Considered to be Interest.
It is impermissible under Florida law to charge interest at the maximum
rate and then increase the effective yield to the lender by compounding interest.14 However, the rule against compounding interest does not prevent bor185. Zmitowski v. Oxley, 161 So. 2d 706 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1964). The same principles apply
where a sale-leaseback is used. See generally Note, Real Estate Sale-Leaseback Agreements
Under Texas Usury Law: Circumvention or Sale?, 7 ST.MARY's L.J. 821 (1976).
186. Mears v. Mfayblum, 96 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 1957).
187. See id. at 225 (documents were executed within days).
138. Bermil Corp. v. Sawyer, 353 So. 2d 579, 582-83 (Fla. 8d D.C.A. 1977). In Sawyer, the
borrower desperately needed money to prevent foreclosure on its shopping center. To get
the necessary $60,000, the borrower sold a 40% interest in the shopping center, worth $200300,000, for $60,000, with an option to repurchase for $100,000. The borrower was held
economically bound to repurchase, and thus the transaction was a $60,000 loan with usurious
interest of $40,000.
139. Dante v. Givens, 156 So. 2d 13, 13 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1963). A $6,800 mortgage was sold
for $3,000, with an option to repurchase for $3,600 in 1-1/2 months -amounting to 165.9%
per annum interest.
140. These factors are inherently present in any interest rate calculation, since i/p - t
equals per annum interest, where "i" equals the sum of all charges considered to be interest,
"p" equals the outstanding principal in the hands of the borrower, and "t" equals the number
of years the principal is outstanding. See Cohen v. District of Columbia Nat'l Bank, 382
F. Supp. 270,287-291, app. (D.D.C. 1974) for sample interest calculation formulas.
141. Morgan v. Mortgage Discount Co., 100 Fla. 124, 129 So. 589 (1930).
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rowers from agreeing to pay interest on overdue interest payments. 1 42 This
exception is based on the rationale that the borrower could avoid payment of
14 3
this additional interest by promptly making the interest payments when due.
Any charges which are extracted by the lender from the principal before it
is advanced to the borrower should be considered interest if not attributable
to a specific expense or service by the lender. 144 Florida courts have traditionally recognized that closing costs, attorneys' fees, document stamps, title insurance, abstract and recording fees and costs for investigation of security or
borrower's character may be passed on to the borrower.145 An example of
charges which were held to constitute interest in one recent case includes a
disbursement fee to the lender, a title insurance kickback to the lender exceeding his cost for the title policy and administrative and application fees and a
brokerage commission to the lender. 146 A currency exchange fee charged by
the lender is not interest if the fee does not exceed the expenses incurred by
the bank in exchanging the currency. 47 The excess is interest whenever a fee
passed on to the borrower exceeds its actual cost to the lender. Permissible
charges have been described judicially as "out of pocket expenses,' 48 "[for]
services rendered,"'' 9 and as "actual and reasonable expenses."' 5 0 These cases
seem to prohibit a lender from making a blanket service charge on every loan
without showing actual expenses representing that charge.
Lenders commonly require the borrower to carry life insurance or insurance on the security. The issue of whether a lender may require a borrower to
get insurance without affecting the interest rate is not clear under Florida
law,' 5 ' even under the statutes applying to specific lenders. One statute allows
credit life insurance without considering it interest but makes no mention of
insurance on the security,152 while another does the opposite153 Other statutes
authorize insurance charges to the applicable lenders without specifying the
142. Id.; Graham v. Fitts, 53 Fla. 1046, 43 So. 512 (1907); Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co.
v. Fisher, 165 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1964).
143. Graham v. Fitts, 53 Fla. 1046, 1053, 43 So. 512, 514 (1907).
144. Abramowitz v. Barnett Bank of W. Orlando, 356 So. 2d 329 (Fla. 4th D.CA. 1978).
145. Mindlin v. Davis, 74 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 1954) (examination of security, dosing costs,
attorneys' fees); Pushee v. Johnson, 123 Fla. 305, 166 So. 847 (1936) (examination of security,
title insurance, closing costs); Abramowitz v. Barnett Bank of W. Orlando, 356 So. 2d 329 (Fla.
4th D.C.A. 1978) (site inspection, out-of-pocket expenditures). See also FtA. STAT. §656.17(1)
(Supp. 1978), (investigation of security on borrower, closing costs, insurance, documentary
stamps, abstract costs and recording fees).
146. Baker Mortgage Co. v. D. Mitchell Inv., Inc., 45 Fla. Supp. 99 (l1th Cir. Ct. 1977).
147. River Hills, Inc. v. Edwards, 190 So. 2d 415, 422-23 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1966).
148. Financial Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Burleigh House, Inc., 305 So. 2d 59, 63 (3d D.C.A.
1974), cert. discharged,336 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1976).
149. Abramowitz v. Barnett Bank of W. Orlando, 356 So. 2d 329, 330 (Fla. 4th D.C.A.
1978).
150. Pushee v. Johnson, 123 Fla. 305, 308, 166 So. 847, 848 (1936).
151. Premiums on insurance were specified as legitimate charges and not considered interest in McGillick v. Chapman, 134 Fla. 220, 225, 184 So. 26, 28 (1938), though the facts did
not indicate what type of insurance.
152. Banking Code, FLA. STAT. §659.18(2)(b) (1977).
153. Florida Consumer Finance Act, FLA. STAT. §516.20(1) (1977).
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type of insurance.154 Although not dispositive, the Federal Truth-in-Lending
law'55 might provide some constructive guidance where the law is uncertain.
Truth-in-Lending specifies that mandatory credit life insurance costs constitute
interest, but that expenses for insurance on the security are not interest unless
the borrower is required to purchase the insurance from a specified agent. It is
dear, however, that a mortgagee may require insurance on mortgaged property
without affecting the interest rate.15
Lenders often charge a one percent "commitment fee," which is consideradon for the lender's promise to make a loan in the future. This fee is not
ordinarily considered interest.157 In one case, however, a commitment fee was
held to be part of the interest charge when the lender treated the fee as interest
by crediting it to the interest discount on the subsequent loan. 58
The lender may also be considered to have received additional interest when
he acquires an advantage from the borrower other than the payment of money.
Although such devices may render a loan usurious, 5 9 they may be exempted
from the usury laws if the value of the collateral advantage depends on the
success of the venture for which a loan of more than $500,000 is used.60
A court may also hold that additional interest has been charged when the
borrower pays a bonus or commission in order to consummate a loan. No
problem arises if the commission is paid to the borrower's own agent or
broker.' 1' The commission will be considered as interest if paid to an agent
154. FLA. STAT. § §656.17, 665.401 (1977).
155. 15 U.S.C. §1605 (1976). Truth-in-Lending is a federal disclosure act mandating that
all interest and other finance charges to the borrower be revealed and expressed in an annual
percentage rate. Accordingly, it includes provisions concerning what charges are considered
interest. Note that FLA. STAT. §626.9551 (1977) prohibits a lender from requiring insurance
or specifying an agent from which it must be purchased. This is an example of the interaction
of Truth-in-Lending, and state usury laws. While both the federal and state laws are very
similar, there can be differences, the result in some situations the effective interest rate of a
transaction under the usury law and the "annual percentage rate" for purposes of Truth-inLending disclosure may differ.
156. FIA. STAT. §687.06 (1977).
157. Financial Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Burleigh House, Inc., 305 So. 2d 59 (Fla. 3d
D.C.A. 1974).
158. Continental Mortgage Investors v. Sailboat Key, Inc., 354 So. 2d 67 (Fla. 3d D.C.A.
1977). The court reasoned that when the lender gave the borrower a credit against interest for
a commitment fee previously paid, he could not claim that the fee was not a part of the
interest after the loan was discovered to be usurious.
159. See, e.g., Cooper v. Rothman, 63 Fa. 394, 57 So. 985 (1912) (interest in profits given
to lender); Continental Mortgage Investors v. Sailboat Key, Inc., 354 So. 2d 67 (Eta. 3d
D.C.A. 1977) (shares of stock to lender); Curtis Nat'l Bank of Miami Springs v. Solomon, 243
So. 2d 475 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1971) (borrower paid debt of another person as a condition of the
loan); Baker Mortgage Co. v. D. Mitchell Inv., Inc., 45 Fla. Supp. 99 (Dade County Cir. Ct.
1977) (borrower made improvements to lender's office).
160. See text accompanying notes 28-29 supra. See also Little v. CasweHl-Doyle-Jones Corp.,
305 So. 2d 842, 844 (Fla. Ist D.C.A. 1975), where the unique nature of a loan by stockholders to
a corporation made the "collateral advantage" doctrine inapplicable.
161. Graham v. Fitts, 53 Fla. 1046, 43 So. 512 (1907); Cutri Enterprises Inc. v. Pan
American Bank of Miami, 115 So. 2d 592 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1959); Shaffran v. Holness, 102 So.
2d 35 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1958).
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of the lender 1 6 2 unless the lender shows that the agent acted outside the scope
of his authority in exacting the commission. 1 03 Authority also suggests that the
mortgagee in a real property transaction may charge the seller points at the
time of the loan, unless the lender knows that the loan will be usurious because
4
such charges will be passed on to the buyer.6
Calculating the Principal.
Usury problems may arise when a lender charges interest based on a
principal which is greater than the sum actually received by the borrower. This
may occur when the principal differs from the face amount of a note or when a
novel financing method, such as a wraparound mortgage, presents uncertainty
over what constitutes the principal. The Florida courts clearly have required
calculation of interest against the actual principal sum received by the borrower
and not against the principal sum set forth in the note. 165 Thus, if a note
recites a principal of $1,000, but the borrower received only $900, then interest
payments of $100 per annum will yield an interest rate of 11.1 percent rather
than ten percent. This situation typically arises when interest is subtracted
from the face value of a discount loan note. The general usury statute in
Florida expressly prohibits the use of a discount to exact interest in excess of
the legal rate. 66 However, prior to 1979, some of the special exemptions to the
usury law allowed the maximum stated rate to be discounted from the principal.. 67 The result is an effective interest yield higher than the stated rate.
Determination of the principal advanced on a loan does not affect the rule
that a borrower may be charged the reasonable expenses incurred by the
lender in making the loan.j68 Nonetheless, the value of these expenses must be
considered in computing principal if the lender subtracts these expenses from
the amount to be advanced to the borrower.
Complications in computing principal develop when repayment is to be
made in installments, because the original principal is not outstanding for
the entire term of the loan. Interest may not be charged as if the entire principal were outstanding for the full term of the loan if the resulting effective
162. Stoutamire v. North Fla. Loan Ass'n, Inc., 152 Fla. 321, 11 So. 2d 570 (1943); Richter
Jewelry Co.. v. Schweinert, 129 Fla. 199, 169 So. 750 (1936); Feemster v. Schurkman, 291
So. 2d 622 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1974); Williamson v. Clark, 120 So. 2d 637 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1960).
163. Enstrom v. Dunning, 124 Fla. 571, 169 So. 385 (1936). No usury problem arises when
the commission is paid to the borrower's own agent and the agent later has a separate agreement to split it with the lender. See Pushee v. Johnson, 123 Fla. 305, 308-15, 166 So. 847,
848-50 (1936). See also Op. ATT'Y GEN. FLA. 074-278 (1974).
164. Enstrom v. Dunning, 124 Fla. 571, 574-75, 169 So. 385, 387 (1936); Pushee v. Johnson,
123 Fla. 305, 312, 166 So. 847, 849 (1936).
165. Wilson v. Conner, 106 Fla. 6, 142 So. 606 (1932). See, e.g., Chakford v. Sturm, 65 So.
2d 864 (Fla. 1953) (when lender knowingly charges borrower a sum greater than actually
loaned, borrower may recover entire sum paid him, plus interest and bonus); Gordon v. West
Fla. Enterprises, 177 So. 2d 859 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1965) (when amount advanced is less than
face amount of note and interest is computed on face amount, a forfeiture penalty of double
the amount of interest will be imposed). See generally Front-end Interest, supra note 20.
166.

FLA. STAT. §687.03(1) (1977).

167. FLA. STAT. §§656.17(1), 659.18 (1977). See notes 71-74 supra and accompanying text.
168. See text accompanying notes 144-150 supra.
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interest rate would exceed the usury limitations.'6 9 Interest must, instead, be
charged on the average outstanding balance.170 However, certain statutes do
allow lenders to charge interest at the stated rate on the entire loan throughout the term, despite the existence of installment repayments. 71 Other statutes
specify a higher rate that must take into account declining principal and
72
calculate interest periodically on the present unpaid balances.
A related issue arises if all of the loan proceeds are not immediately released. This situation exists in many construction loans, in which the loan is
agreed upon but money is only advanced by the lender in stages corresponding
with the progress of construction. The lender may charge interest only upon
that portion of the loan actually outstanding. The loan is usurious if interest
is computed upon the withheld funds, yielding an effective rate which exceeds
the statutory limit.173
The problem of determining the amount of principal is also present in
"wraparound" mortgage situations in which the lender uses a portion of the
loan proceeds to pay a previous mortgage or debt of the borrower. For example,
an individual may wish to borrow $5,000 secured by a mortgage. If the property is subject to an existing first mortgage of $5,000, both parties may wish to
have only one mortgage lien on the property rather than a second mortgage.
To obtain a single mortgage, the borrower might sign a note for $10,000, half
of which is to be used to pay the outstanding mortgage. The problem arises
when the lender continues to make periodic payments instead of immediately
applying the loan proceeds to satisfy the prior obligation. Thus, if the lender
withholds payment on the assumed obligation, it has only advanced $5,000 but
received interest on $10,000. The lender realizes no net gain by withholding
payment on the assumed obligation when the interest rate on the first and
second loans is identical. However, the lender will profit by withholding payment if the interest rate receivable on the second loan exceeds the interest rate
payable on the first loan. In this case, the lender may retain the use of money
which it was bound to pay over in the amount of the assumed obligation. The
lender might also earn additional interest to the extent of the interest rate
differential between the first and second loans. This additional interest which
is attributable to the second loan may operate to increase the effective yield
169. Silver Sands v. Pensacola Loan & Sav. Bank, 174 So. 2d 61 (Fla. Ist D.CA. 1965).
Strangely, few cases have directly addressed this principle, although some have considered it
in dictum. See, e.g., Brown v. Home Credit Co., 137 So. 2d 887, 892 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1962);
Ayvas v. Green, 57 So. 2d 30, 33 (Fla. 1952). In other cases, it is clear from the court's calculations that it employed this assumption. See, e.g., Gordon v. W. Fla. Enterprises, 177 So. 2d
859 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1965).

170. When payments of principal and interest on a loan are made in equal installments,
the average balance over the term is found by multiplying the initial principal by the fraction
z/(y2), where z equals the sum of the digits and the number of installment payments to be
made and y equals the number of payments. See note 73 supra.
171. See text accompanying notes 78-89 supra and former FLA. STAT. §656.17(1) (1977)
(industrial savings banks); FLA. STAT. §659.18 (1977) (bank loans not exceeding $15,000).
172. FLA. STAT. §657.14 (1977) (interest rates on credit union loans); FLA. STAT. §659.181
(1977) (bank loans not exceeding $5,000 on credit card or overdraft financing arrangement).
173. Williamson v. Clark, 120 So. 2d 637 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1960).
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above the usury ceiling. If the first $5,000 mortgage assumed by the lender in
the example above bears six percent interest, and $1,500 a year interest is paid
by the borrower on the second $5,000 loan, the lender's effective yield is
fourteen percent. 1 4 Because the principal for purposes of interest calculations

is the $5,000 balance rather than the face $10,000 amount,'l75 this means of
increasing effective yield has been held usurious in Florida.
The above example is a refinancing wraparound mortgage as opposed to a
purchase money wraparound mortgage or a purchase money wraparound
mortgage with third-party financing. One author suggests the results may differ
if the wraparound is used in different contexts. 76 On the other hand, one recent
Florida case, although remanded for additional factfinding, suggests that courts
may take a similar view of the purchase money wraparound with a third-party
lender. 7 If the seller of property is also the lender, he may have a better argument against appliction of the usury provisions in that he is reaping an advantage due to his own low-rate prior mortgage. 7 8 This is much different from
the situation in which another lender demands that he be able to take advantage of the borrower's low-rate first mortgage as a condition of making the
loan. There is no assurance, however, that the courts will distinguish between
these types of agreements, and all forms of wraparound mortgages should be
cautiously treated.
Usury issues arise with respect to wraparound mortgages because there are
competing views on the means of computing principal. One alterantive is to
ignore the wraparound ramifications and consider the principal to be the entire
amount of the new mortgage ($10,000 in the example above). A second alterna174.

This can be illustrated as follows:
first mortgage

new loan

$5,000 balance
$1,500/yr. payment

$10,000 balance
$1,500/yr. payment

6 % = $300

10% = $1,000

The lender thus nets $700 interest, which, on his investment of $5,000, equals 14%. Actually,
the effective yield eventually becomes greater, because the $5,000 loan will be paid before the
first $5,000 of the new loan is paid.
175. Mindlin v. Davis, 74 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 1954). See Lowell, A Current Analysis of the
Usury Laws; A National View, 8 SAN DIEGO L. Rav. 193, 213-14 (1971). The author cites no
cases in the United States on wraparounds and indicates there have been none decided since
Mindlin. See also Note, Wrap-Around Financing:A Technique for Skirting the Usury Laws?,
1972 Duaa L.J. 785 (1972).
176. See Note, supra note 175, at 801.
177. I.R.E. Financial Corp. v. Cassel, 335 So. 2d 598 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1976). The facts are
sketchy in the district court of appeal's opinion, but they show that the defendant as a
broker purchased property subject to two existing mortgages and conveyed it to plaintiff in
exchange for a $1,300,000 mortgage. Plaintiff sued and contended that the $234,000 interest
paid to date should be computed against $268,000 principal instead of against the full
$1,300,000, which included the previous encumbrances. The defendant had not satisfied those
encumbrances and was paying them in installments. The loan was held usurious on summary
judgment by the circuit court. The district court of appeal reversed and remanded, concluding
that it was a question of fact as to whether the transaction was actually usurious.
178. See Note, supra note 175, at 801-02.
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tive would consider the principal to be only the amount advanced by the
lender ($5,000 in the example above), while ignoring the fact that the lender
must simultaneously make payments on the prior mortgage. This is a harsh
result because it exaggerates the rate of interest actually being received by the
of principal when the
lender and could in some instances result in forfeiture
79
this is the
Nevertheless,
limits.
legal
within
is
effective yield to the lender
80
effective
the
to
look
would
alternative
third
The
approach Florida has taken.
8
yield received by the lender.' '
One bill proposed in the Florida House of Representatives in 1977 addressed the wraparound mortgage, considering interest to be "the effective rate
81 2
of interest paid by the debtor to the lender."' These words, without more,
merely beg the question of which sum should be considered as principal in
computing the interest paid by the debtor. The proposal was stricken from its
"
and has not been proposed again. The third alternative is the
parent bill 83
best approach to the problem because computing the actual interest to the
lender by using the wraparound avoids harsh results but preserves the longstanding policy that no "contrivance or device whatever" shall be used to
84
circumvent the usury laws.
The Term During Which Principal is Outstanding.
An essential element of the interest rate computation is the length of the
loan term. Complications may arise where the loan does not run for the fully
anticipated term. This problem typically occurs in two cases: when the borrower exercises an early payment option, and when the lender invokes an
acceleration clause.
When a borrower exercises an option to pay the loan before maturity, no
usury problem arises if the lender rebates any unearned interest taken in ad179. To illustrate this point, assume the first mortgage is for $800,000 and the lender
takes a wraparound mortgage for $1,000,000. This result would consider the principal to be
$200,000. If interest of 10% is charged the first year, that $100,000 would be considered 50%
per annum interest. But if the lender must simultaneously pay 9% interest on the $800,000,

he is receiving net interest of $28,000 ($100,000-$72,000), which is 14% of his $200,000 invest-

ment. The first result would mean a forfeiture of interest and principal for the lender under

the criminal usury sanctions. The forfeiture would be of $1,000,000 and not just $200,000,
because he would still be obligated to pay the first mortgage. However, the latter result would
fall within the 18% allowed by FLA. STAT. §687.03 (Supp. 1978), as amended by 1979 Fla
Laws, ch. 79-274, §13, and would not be usurious at all.

180. Mindlin v. Davis, 74 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 1954).
181. Though the court does not indicate, this seems to have been the approach taken by

the lower court in I.R.E. Financial Corp. v. Cassel, 335 So. 2d 598 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1976).

Under the first approach, the loan would not have been usurious. Under the second approach, the rate of interest would have been between 80 and 90%, resulting in a forfeiture of

principal. That the court only sought a forfeiture of double the interest paid indicates the

court took the third approach. On the other hand, Mindlin v. Davis, 74 So. 2d 789, 792 (Fla.
1954), took the second approach, considering the principal amount equal only to the new
funds advanced.
182. Fla. H.R. 2314 (Reg. Sess. 1977).
183. H.R. JOURNAL 1115 (Reg. Sess. 1977).
184. FLA. STAT. §687.03(1) (1977).
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vance and exacts no prepayment penalty. This is expressly required by some
of the statutes creating special exceptions to the general usmy
rates. 85 One
recent decision held that a prepayment fee did not constitute
interest where
the borrower paid the loan before maturity. 8 6 The Florida
courts have not,
however, allowed a lender to take by prepayment fees in an
amount greater
than that which could be taken as interest had the loan run for
the full term. s7
This is a sound limitation, because the justification for prepayment
fees is the
loss of the lender's anticipated profit.
An entirely different problem is created when the loan term
ceases to run
because of a provision giving the lender the right to accelerate
the full indebtedness upon the borrower's default on any payment. A complicated
line of
Florida cases' 8s dealing with loan acceleration suggests that the
mere existence,
without enforcement, of an acceleration clause which does
not provide for
return of unearned interest attributable to the remainder of an
accelerated loan
term does not render the underlying loan usurious.189 Once a
lender attempts
enforcement of the loan and obtains a final decree, effective
interest will be
computed over a term ending at the date of the decree.9o This
judicial rule
has not been tested in light of the more recent "spreader" statute,
which dictates
that despite early collection by court action, interest taken in
advance will be
prorated over the agreed term of the loan in determining
its effect on the
interest rate.'91 This procedure applies to charges other than the
stated interest
rate, which are taken in advance and would not seem to affect
regular installments of interest.192 The probable effect of the Florida acceleration
rule is that
for charges other than those to be spread over the full term by
statute, a lender
should either provide for rebate of any unearned interest upon
acceleration
or must await maturity to obtain a foreclosure decree.
Finally, the use of a 360-day formula in computing interest may
render a
185. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §659 .18(4)(a) (1977).
186. American Wood Prod., Inc. v. Walter E. Heller & Co. S.E., 358
So. 2d 1149 (Fla. 8d
D.C.A. 1978). The district court erred in referring to the case as being
one of first impression.
In Dezell v. King, 91 So. 2d 624 (Fla. 1956), it was held that although
a lean exceeded the
maximum interest rate when the borrower prepaid and the lender
demanded interest for the
remainder of the term, there was no requisite intent by the lender
to exact usury. The
decision is ambiguous. Rather than sanction prepayment fees flatly,
the court held that they
were interest but that there was no proof the lender intended usury.
At the same time, the
court quoted from authorities broadly allowing prepayment fees. Note
that American Wood
Prod.is seemingly in conflict with Dezell in holding that prepayment
charges are not interest.
See American Wood Prod., Inc. 358 So. 2d at 1150-51.
187. American Wood Prod.did not state this limitation, but the lender
dcmanded no more
than he could have received had the loan run full term. Dezell v.
King, 91 So. 2d 624 (Fla.
1956) hinted that the court would not accept such an excessive prepayment
fee.
188.
See Boyer & Berger, Usury and the Viruliferous Acceleration
Clause in Florida, 21

U. MrAmi L. REv. 215, 224-27 (1966).
189. Home Credit Co. v. Brown, 148 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 1962); Green
Ridge Corp. v. South
Jersey Mortgage Co., 211 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1968).
190. See authorities cited note 189 supra.
191. See notes 20-27 supra and accompanying text.
192. FiA. STAT. §687.03 (1977). See also Sailboat Apartment Corp.
v. Chase Manhattan
Mortgage &Realty Trust, 363 So. 2d 564 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1978).
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loan usurious.19 3 The method is widely practiced because it results in easy
calculation. One congressional study showed that eighty-two percent of banks
used the method.19 4 The 360-day formula computes effective annual interest on
the basis of interest accumulating in the course of 360 days, while statutory
interest rates limit the interest receivable over a 365-day period. The statutory
base period yields a higher cumulation of interest and, therefore, a higher rate
than the 360-day formula. Consequently, interest calculated at the maximum
legal rate based on a 360-day period is usurious.195
Intent to Exact Usurious Interest
A usury action is not concluded by a mathematical determination that
actual interest exceeded the legal rate. 90 Florida law requires the borrower to
prove that the lender intended to exact the interest received, 97 although proof
of specific intent to violate the usury statutes is not required19S Therefore, a
lender's mere profession of ignorance that a usury provision was controlling
does not defeat a usury claim,"9 3 nor does the fact the borrower suggested a
usurious agreement constitute a defense.200 One court has suggested that reliance on the advice of counsel does not conclusively demonstrate absence of
the requisite intent.201 The intent standard has been phrased in terms of good
faith,20 2 and the Florida courts have implied that an experienced lender will
203
be held to a higher standard than others.
There is little guidance on which factors demonstrate lack of intent. The
appellate decisions adhere to the rule that intent is an issue of fact and accept
193. Ellis Nat'1 Bank of Tallahassee v. Davis, 359 So. 2d 466 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1978); Op.
Aa-r'y GEN. FLA. 075-269 (1975). See also American Timber & Trading Co. v. First Nat'l Bank
of Or., 511 F.2d 980 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 921 (1975). See generally Comment,
Banking -When Statutory Maximum Interest Rate Becomes Usury: Interest Formulas, 6 U.
TOL. L. Rav. 541 (1975).
194. 117 CONG. REc. 18538, 92nd Cong., Ist Sess. (1971).
195. Ellis Nat'l Bank of Tallahassee v. Davis, 359 So. 2d 466 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1978).
196. Dixon v. Sharp, 276 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 1975). The Dixon dissenters condemned the
decision as allowing ignorance of the law to be an excuse. Id. at 823 (Ervin, Boyd, JJ., dissenting). The Florida supreme court decided, however, that the lower court erred by holding
that a mere mathematical computation would suffice to show usury.
197. See note 126 supra and accompanying text.
198. American Acceptance Corp. v. Schoenthaler, 891 F.2d 64, 73 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
392 U.S. 873 (1968); W.B. Dunn Co. v. Mercantile Credit Corp., 275 So. 2d 311 (Fla. Ist D.CA.
1973); Ross v. Whitman, 181 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1966).
199. Shorr v. Skafte, 90 So. 2d 604 (Fla. 1956); River Hills, Inc. v. Edwards, 190 So. 2d
415 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1966).
200. Ross v. Whitman, 181 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1966); Lee Constr. Corp. v. Newman, 143 So. 2d 222 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1962). But see Dixon v. Sharp, 276 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 1973),
where the court noted the fact that the borrower suggested the usurious bonus. Id. at 819.
201. River Hills, Inc. v. Edwards, 190 So. 2d 415, 424 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1966).
202. Dixon v. Sharp, 276 So. 2d 817, 819 (Fla. 1973); Sumner v. Inv. Mortgage Co. of Fla.,
332 So. 2d 103, 105 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1976); River Hills, Inc. v. Edwards, 190 So. 2d 415, 423
(Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1966); Stewart v. Nangle, 103 So. 2d 649, 652 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1958).
203. Dixon v. Sharp, 276 So. 2d 817, 822-23 (Fla. 1973) (Ervin, J. dissenting); Lee Constr.
Corp. v. Newman, 143 So. 2d 222, 224-25 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1962); Stewart v. Nangle, 103 So. 2d
649, 653 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1958).
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the trial courts' findings with little discussion.204 Therefore, a lender which
raises lack of intent as a defense to usury will be precluded from obtaining
summary judgment because an issue of fact is in dispute. 20 5 The likelihood of
a jury trial operates to the disadvantage of the lender; in an age of high interest rates, a jury composed of consumers is likely to be sympathetic to the bor208
rower.
The only fact which has been clearly acknowledged as demonstrating lack
of intent is a showing that the usurious overcharge was inadvertent. Thus, an
overcharge due to a bookkeeping or similar error 20 7 or due to accidental failure
to rebate interest when a loan closed six days later than planned 20 8 is not
usurious. One decision implies that the requisite intent is absent where the
lender obtains an opinion from the state comptroller that a proposed loan is
not usurious. 20 9 Another case suggests that no intent is present where the
lender is unaware that his agreement to take a percentage of certain sales by
the borrower would result in enough additional income to exceed the usury
limitations.210

Procedurally, intent must be affirmatively pleaded and proved by the borrower. 211 In doing so, he is permitted to introduce into evidence loan agree212
ments between the lender and third persons.
Another consideration of intent is presented when a suit for usury involves
persons other than the parties to the original loan agreement. When the
lender's partner, for instance, is unaware of the usurious nature of the transaction, he is without the requisite intent.21s If a note is assigned, the test of
whether the assignee is liable for usury is similar to the "bona fide purchaser"
test.21 4 The assignee will not be shielded from a usury claim if he is involved
in the transaction from the outset 2 5 or takes an assignment of an overdue note,
216
thus raising a duty of inquiry as to its usurious nature.

204. Continental Mortgage Investors v. Sailboat Key, Inc., 354 So. 2d 67 (Fla. 3d D.C.A.
1977); Brown v. Home Credit Co., 137 So. 2d 887, 891 (Fla. 2d D.C.A.), aIJ'd, 148 So. 2d 257
(Fla. 1962).
205. Parker v. Bryce, 96 So. 2d 154, 155 (Fla. 1957); Abramowitz v. Barnett Bank of W.
Orlando, 356 So. 2d 329 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1978).
206. See Anderson, Tight Money Real Estate Financingand the Florida Usury Statute, 24
U. MIAMI L. REy. 642, 643 (1970).

207. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Fisher, 165 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1964).
208. Mindlin v. Davis, 74 So. 2d 789, 792 (Fla. 1954).
209. Sumner v. Inv. Mortgage Co. of Fla., 332 So. 2d 103, 104 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1976).
210. Stewart v. Nangle, 103 So. 2d 649, 652-53 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1958).
211. River Hills, Inc. v. Edwards, 190 So. 2d 415, 424 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1966).
212. Id. See also Continental Mortgage Investors v. Village By the Sea, Inc., 252 So. 2d
833 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1971).
213. Bermil Corp. v. Sawyer, 353 So. 2d 579 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1977).
214.

FLA. STAT. §687.04 (1977). The assignee must have given value for the note and we

have no reason to know of its usurious character.
215. American Acceptance Corp. v. Schoenthaler, 391 F.2d 64 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 392
U.S. 873 (1968); Brown v. Home Credit Co., 137 So. 2d 887 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1962).
216. Enstrom v. Dunning, 136 Fla. 253, 186 So. 806 (1939).
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MEANS OF AVOIDING UsuRY LAWS:
CONTRACTING FOR APPLICATION or FOREIGN LAW

Florida courts recognize the conflict of laws principle that contracting
parties may agree to apply the law of any jurisdiction having "reasonable
contacts" with the transaction to any dispute arising under the contract. 217 In
the absence of an express choice of law provision, the validity of a contract is
governed by the law of the jurisdiction in which the contract is made. 218 These
principles suggest that Florida usury law may be avoided either by structuring
a transaction around predominantly extraterritorial contacts or by expressly
providing that another jurisdiction's usury law applied to the loan. However,
the utility of these devices is tempered by Florida's prohibition against any
"contrivance" to avoid the usury laws. 219 Sham contract executions in another
jurisdiction for the sole purpose of avoiding Florida usury law may be disregarded by the courts.22 0 Where another jurisdiction's law is designated as controlling by the loan agreement, the adequacy of the relation which the jurisdiction bears to the contract will be carefully scrutinized. If the contacts are insufficient, the choice of law provision may be held to be a device to circumvent
22
Florida usury laws and thus void. '

The Florida Third District Court of Appeal suggested that Florida public
policy may render a choice of law loan provision unenforceable notwithstanding adequate contacts with the foreign jurisdiction. In ContinentalMortgage
Investors v. Sailboat Key, Inc.,222 the court struck down a foreign choice of law
provision and held the instant loan usurious under the Florida Statutes. The
court found insufficient contacts between the loan and the foreign jurisdiction,
but used this factor only as a "second compelling reason" for its holding.223
The primary basis for the decision was the repugnance to Florida's public
policy of the loan's interest rate, which exceeded twenty-five percent. 22 4 While
the precedential value of this public policy ground may be questionable, it
217. Goodman v. Olsen, 305 So. 2d 753, 755 (Fla. 1974), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 839 (1975).
218. Bella Isla Constr. Corp. v. Trust Mortgage Corp., 347 So. 2d 649, 651 (Fla. 3d D.CA.
1977).
219. FLA. STAT. §687.08(1), (1977).

220. Bella Isla Constr. Corp. v. Trust Mortgage Corp., 847 So. 2d 649, 652 (Fla. 3d D.CA.
1977).
221. Id. at 658; May v. United States Leasing Corp., 289 So. 2d 78, 75 (Fla. 4th D.C.A.
1970). In Bella Isla, the note specified that Puerto Rican law would apply. The lender was
incorporated in Puerto Rico, but was doing business in Florida. The transaction was primarily connected with Florida, except that the lender required the Florida resident borrower
to incorporate in Puerto Rico and to travel there to close the deal. The court reversed a
dismissal of the usury claim, and directed the lower court to determine as an issue of fact
whether Puerto Rico had sufficient contacts with the deal. 849 So. 2d at 658.
222. 354 So. 2d 67 (Fla. 3d D.CA. 1977).
228. Id. at 71. The opinion contains a good example of the "contacts" which will be
examined: (1) locale of borrower, (2) locale of real estate taken as security, (8) where loan
was negotiated, (4) where documents were prepared, (5) approval of the loan by an in-state
advisor to the lender business trust, (6) where funds were disbursed to the borrower and
(7) that the only contact with the designated state occurred when the parties flew from Florida
to Massachusetts to dose the loan. Id. at 72.
224. 854 So. 2d at 71 n.3 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1977).
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serves as a clear warning to lenders of the Florida courts' attitude toward a
loan which purports to invoke the more lenient usury law of another jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION

In an era of soaring interest rates and the accompanying pressures on
lenders to charge the maximum allowable interest and fees, the rulings of the
Florida courts stand as a warning to lenders who use any device to increase
their effective yields above lawful rates. Be it a sale-repurchase agreement, a
wraparound mortgage, or any other contrivance the courts uniformly have
strictly applied the usury laws. Predictably, during a period of high interest
rates, many lenders will fall prey to the usury trap.
Lenders have entered the current high-interest period with new high-yield
weapons in their loan arsenals in the form of higher rates, interest parity and
a somewhat clarified savings and loan exemption. But while the legislature has
provided, in the form of statutory exemptions and interest parity, relief for
lenders squeezed between the state's former ten percent ceiling and soaring
interest rates, much of this relief has been rendered at least partially unusable
by poor draftmanship of the usury statutes. Constructive steps were taken in
1979 to alleviate this situation.
Nevertheless, Florida's interest rate statutes need further simplification and
reform. Each of the usury exemptions should be stated in terms of a simple
percentage rate. However during periods of rising interest rates, explicitly increasing usury limits to comport with commercial reality would be a political
liability for any legislator. Consequently, obscure statutory devices which enhance the lender's allowable return may partially reflect a legislative desire to
present the electorate with assuasive usury legislation.225
Such obfuscation ultimately yields a net benefit to neither the legislature
nor the public. Lenders are harmed by the resultant complexity and uncertainty which discourages use of the available exemptions, presumably in contravention of the legislature's intent. Borrowers are injured because loan transactions structured according to the exemptions involve charges which not only
preclude a simple interest statement, but which also differ between lenders,
rendering effective evaluation or comparison of loan terms impossible for all
but the sophisticated borrower. Finally, by maintaining nonuniform usury provisions, the legislature is impeded in its effort to establish a sound statutory
framework.
These shortcomings could be rectified by a complete statutory reform stating
all allowable charges as a simple interest rate. In addition, all usury-related
provisions should be consolidated in one chapter, rather than scattered through
ten different sections of the Florida Statutes. This would be particularly appropriate in view of the current statutory movement to provide a uniform rate
for most transactions. A study of the interest parity provision will show that in
face of the 1979 Act, it is largely superflous. Therefore, because it provides
225. 1979 Fla. Laws, ch. 79-274, §13: "[I]t shall not be usury . . .unless the rate exceeds
the rate prescribedin [s.] 687.071." (emphasis added).
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only confusion to an already complicated area of law, it should be repealed.
Such changes will provide Florida with a uniform and simplified usury statute,
understandable by both lenders and borrowers.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol31/iss4/4

30

